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The complex business structure of corporate groups has many legislative challenges. One such
issue is the operation of avoidance provisions in the bankruptcy context. The paper inves-
tigates this matter focusing on the recent recommendations made by UNCITRAL in this
area. The paper unearths the underlying principles of the new proposals against the backdrop
of the “entity law” versus “enterprise law” debate (regarding groups regulation) and the
general goals of bankruptcy laws, as well as considers the extent to which these proposals are
desirable. The paper also discusses the relationship between avoidance provisions and other
solutions for the bankruptcy of groups and the problems which arise where multiple juris-
dictions are affected by voidable transactions.
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I Introduction
While the concept of avoiding transactions which harm creditors can be dated
back to Roman times,1 corporate groups are a much more recent phenomen-
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1 The Paulian Action (action Pauliana) regarding transactions in fraud of creditors is
derived from Roman law.
on.2 Perhaps this is why the application of transaction avoidance provisions in
the context of groups’ bankruptcies3 is not trivial.
Avoidance provisions can promote a fair and efficient insolvency system – one
which treats stakeholders equitably,4 minimises costs inherent to bankruptcy
and maximises wealth. Such provisions address misbehaviour of managers
near default, ensuring that creditors as a whole are treated equitably by allow-
ing payments made or property transferred under certain transactions to be
returned to the company or their effect reversed. In doing so, the law takes into
account the diversity of creditors’ types and the different positions of the
relevant stakeholders vis-a-vis the company.5 It appreciates that the managers
are in a position to divert assets to themselves or to connected persons, acting
near default.6 Among the creditors, somemay be ‘mal-adjusting’, i.e. in a weak
position, and may have little or no opportunity to calculate such risks,7 while
others may be able to pressurise the company and make it favour them.8 If
transactions conducted for the purpose of benefiting the company are not
attacked but only those which have worsened the company’s position, a prop-
er balance is struck between the need to ensure the ultimacy of the transaction,
certainty and stability and the need to remedy the harm caused to creditors.
Otherwise, fraud should always be combated and dishonest transactions
should be attacked.9 The adjustment of transactions further preserves collec-
2 It appears that corporate groups first surfaced in the US at the end of the 19th century (see
on the emergence of corporate groups PI Blumberg The Multinational Challenge to
Corporation Law: the search for a new corporate personality (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1993) [hereinafter: Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge]).
3 The article uses the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” interchangeably.
4 By according equal respect and consideration to all relevant interested parties in the
choice of insolvency law principles (see R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice of Equality (2000), 11; R Dworkin, “The Original Position” in Reading Rawls:
Critical Studies on Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (Norman Daniels, ed. 1989), 50).
5 A fair distribution between creditors requires taking into account their relative bargain-
ing power and vulnerability in regard to their ability to respond to bankruptcy risks ex
ante and their ability to bear bankruptcy loss ex post (see e.g. E Warren “Bankruptcy
Policy” (1987) 54 Univ. of Chicago Law Rev. 775, 778).
6 RJMokal,Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OxfordUniversity Press,
Oxford 2005) [hereinafter: Mokal, Corporate Insolvency], 308.
7 I.M. Ramsay, Models of Corporate Regulation: The Mandatory/Enabling Debate in
R. Grantham and C. Rickett (eds), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century 215, 253
(1998), 256; V. Brudney,Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times
and Good 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 (1992).
8 Mokal, Corporate Insolvency (supra note 6) 309.
9 See D.G. Baird, “Legal Approaches to Restricting Distribution to Shareholders: The
Role of Fraudulent Transfer Law” (2006) EBOR 7, 199 [hereinafter: Baird, Legal Ap-
proaches].
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tivity in insolvency (avoiding the “common pool” problem10) and ensures
value is not destroyed by removing assets from the estate. In particular, rescue
attempts may be undermined where the company is deprived of assets which
are essential for its ongoing activity.11 Thus, reversing vulnerable transactions
can enlarge the insolvency estate and increase returns to creditors.12
This is also recognised internationally. Proclamations of broadly accepted
insolvency objectives provided in the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Insolvency Guide (“the Insolvency
Guide”)13 suggest that creditors should be treated equitably.14 This, it is sug-
gested, requires addressing problems of fraud and favouritism thatmay arise in
cases of financial distress by providing, for example, that acts and transactions
detrimental to equitable treatment of creditors can be avoided.15 The Insol-
vency Guide also stresses the goal of maximising the value of the estate,16 in
particular by imposing a collective process and stopping the race to collect.17 It
furthermore states that the insolvency law should allow for the possibility of
reorganisation where the value of the debtor to society and to creditors may be
maximised by allowing it to continue its business activities.18
The phenomenon of corporate groups – comprised as they are of separate but
linked entities19 – challenges the operation of transaction adjustments in bank-
ruptcy. Managers may not only consider the situation of the particular com-
10 Created when diverse ‘co-owners’ assert rights against a common pool of assets (see
T.H. Jackson “Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy and the creditors’ bargain” (1982) 91 Yale
L.J. 857).
11 Synergetic values created by the presence of the appropriate combinations of productive
assets within the estate may be destroyed (see Mokal,Corporate Insolvency (supra note
6), 310).
12 Though, consideration should also be given to the potential cost of litigation and the
likelihood of success of the attempt to tackle a transaction.
13 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL]
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004.
14 Ibid., Part One, Ch. I (B), Para. 10 (Objective 6).
15 Ibid., Para. 7 (Objective 4). See also ibid., Part two, Ch. II, Para. 151.
16 Ibid, Para. 5 (Objective 2).
17 See also I. F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2005, supplement 2007) [hereinafter: Fletcher, Insolvency], 9 (observing
that the concept of collectivity is shared among legal systems).
18 The Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part one, Ch. 1 (B), Para. 6 (Objective 3).
19 The question of the nature of the links between entities and what makes them a group is
a question not uniformly answered in different regimes, but in a recent addition to the
Insolvency Guide, it is suggested that an enterprise group will be defined as: “two or
more enterprises that are interconnected by control or significant ownership.” (a pre-
release (21 July 2010) of the new Part (Part III) is available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/insolven/pre-leg-guide-part-three.pdf> [accessed:May 2011] [herein-
after: Part III of the Guide], Glossary 4(a)).
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pany when they enter into such transactions, but possibly also that of other
affiliates; favoured creditors may be affiliated companies; transactions may
include cross-guarantees and loans to different parts of the group; they may
also present themselves in massive amounts where intra-group transactions
were the routine; and the entry into transactions may range from fraud to
negligence to implementing a group policy designed to save the group.20 Bear-
ing in mind these varying circumstances and special relationship between
group members, the general rules on voidable transactions may not give suf-
ficient solutions in the group context. The question is how the voidable trans-
actions provisions may be adjusted to accommodate the group phenomenon,
and whether other remedies for groups in bankruptcy may be more appro-
priate for combating fraudulent and other suspect transactions under certain
circumstances.
This issue is timely and significant, not only because the phenomenon of
groups is now prominent in global commerce21 and the global financial crisis
highlighted the need for immediate solutions to meet the challenges of large-
scale defaults,22 but also because thematter of groups in bankruptcy (including
the treatment of vulnerable transactions) has been recently discussed on the
international level (by an UNCITRAL working group) and a set of interna-
tional standards has been proposed.23 Obviously, the success of these recent
endeavours depends on their wide implementation by national regimes.24 It is
20 See further infra Part IV.
21 I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (Oxford University
Press, 2009), 33 [hereinafter: Mevorach, Enterprise Groups].
22 See e.g. alleged intra-group transfers which took place prior to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers banking group (S. Tucker,Lehman’s Asia Risk is Revealed, November 26 2008.
Financial Times; V. HeanyWinding Up Lehman, Accountancy (2008) 142 (1383) 94),
and alleged fraud regarding intra-group claims between Parmalat subsidiaries (see
“Parmalat ask Kroll to find assets”, Financial Times, March 2, 2004; D Reilly “Judge
Rejects Administrator’s Push To Control Parmalat’s Cayman Units”, DOWJONES
Newsletters, International Insolvency, March 2, 2004, p. 1, 3)
23 Onwhich see infra Part III.B.2. The proposals ofWorkingGroupV (the working group
of UNCITRAL which deals with insolvency matters) will be added to the Insolvency
Guide as Part III (see Part III of the Guide, n 19). I had the privilege of serving as an
adviser to the UK delegation in the deliberation of the Working Group, yet the views
expressed in this study in regard to the work of UNCITRAL are, of course, my own
views and do not necessarily reflect those of the UK delegation or of the Working
Group. There are also interesting developments within the EU regarding cross-border
banking groups in crises, yet the peculiar case of banks and other financial institutions is
outside the scope of this paper (see R. Nattrass, “Cross-border intra-group asset trans-
fers: too big to ignore?” 5 JIBFL (2010) on these developments).
24 S. Block-Lieb and T. Halliday “Harmonization and Modernization in UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” (2007) 42 Tex. Int’l L. J. 475, 511 [hereinafter:
Block-Lieb and Halliday, Harmonization] (noting that in order to assess the harmoni-
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therefore crucial to unearth the underlying principles of the proposals at this
stage and appreciate the extent to which they are desirable (and should thus be
considered favourably by policy makers). This is the task this article sets forth
to undertake. The article also examines the relationship between the proposals
and other solutions for groups in bankruptcy discussed by UNCITRAL, and
briefly addresses the complexities arising when transactions (involving group
members) affect multiple legal regimes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of avoidance
provisions available in different legal regimes, taking both a comparative and
an international perspective. Thus, common denominators are highlighted as
well as international standards proposed in this area “from the top”. Part III
discusses the group problem. It first introduces the basic dilemma in the treat-
ment of groups in general, i.e. the tension between entity law and enterprise
principles and the legitimising arguments of each approach. In this light, dif-
ferent problems associated with groups should be resolved. Against this back-
ground, the recommendations of UNCITRAL regarding avoidance provi-
sions in the group context are then analysed, as well as the relationship
between avoidance provisions and other solutions for group insolvencies. Part
IV comments on the international complexities, and Part V concludes.
II Typical Avoidance Provisions
Transactions avoidance provisions are found in many bankruptcy laws.25
Although there are variations in the details of these provisions,26 they are based
on some common objectives,27 and have some significant similarities. As the
paper seeks to demonstrate the desirability of some adjustments to avoidance
provisions in the context of corporate groups, which should be considered
across nations, it is important to firstly highlight such agreements between
legal regimes regarding the basic elements of avoiding powers before discus-
sing the group problem. This section will, therefore, delineate the typical
avoidance provisions found in legal regimes, stressing the similarities between
sation effect of the Guide we will need to study the legislation the Guide has inspired
and the implementation of that legislation by courts, insolvency representatives and
insolvency professionals).
25 J.L.Westbrook ‘Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm’ (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 1019,
1021; Fletcher, Insolvency (supra note 17), 400; J.L. Westbrook, “Avoidance of Pre-
Bankruptcy Transactions in Multinational Bankruptcy Cases” (2007) 42 Tex. Int’l
L. J. 899, 901-02 [hereinafter: Westbrook, Avoidance]). See also the Insolvency Guide
(supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Para. 150.
26 Ibid.
27 Those objectives were delineated above (see supra notes 14–18 and accompanying texts).
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them (i.e. the usual powers and typical criteria attached to them),28 as well as
refer to the international standards of avoidance provisions (already agreed
upon in the original Insolvency Guide).29
The Insolvency Guide mentions three types of avoidable transactions that are
found in most legal systems: transactions intended to defeat, hinder or delay
creditors from collecting their claims; transactions at an undervalue; and trans-
actions with certain creditors that have the effect of preferring them over all
other creditors.30 Each of these avoidable transactions has some specific char-
acteristics, depending on the circumstances of the transaction. They may have
characteristics of more than one power to avoid, and thus the insolvency
representative may be able to choose on which basis to challenge it.31
Avoiding powers related to transactions defrauding creditors are the most
ancient – as aforementioned, they find their origins in the actio Pauliana of
Roman law. For the challenge of a transaction as fraudulent it is usually re-
quired to prove intent of the debtor, normally by identifying circumstances or
indicators that are common to this type of transaction, such as the relationship
between the parties involved in the transaction, the fact that the transaction
was concealed and so forth.32 It is also quite usual that transactions that involve
intentionally wrongful conduct are regarded avoidable either without any
reference to a specific suspect period (i.e. such transactions can be avoided
even if entered into in the ordinary course of the company’s business and not in
the vicinity of insolvency) or with reference to a very long time limit.33 This
suits the goal of combating fraud – dishonest behaviour should never be
encouraged.34
Undervalued transactions would generally be avoidable where the value re-
ceived by the debtor company as the result of the transactionwas eithermerely
nominal or non-existent, e.g. when the company made a gift, or where the
28 This will be mainly based on the commentary on avoidance provisions in different legal
regimes provided in the InsolvencyGuide (Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two,
Ch. II, Paras. 148–202).
29 Provided in the Insolvency Guide (ibid., recommendations 87–99).
30 Ibid, Part two, Para. 170.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, Para. 172. Yet, there may be differences regarding the level of proof required to
establish intent to defraud. Most notably, in ‘haven’ jurisdictions (specialising in off-
shore trusts) it is usual to require proof beyond reasonable doubt that the debtor had
intent to defraud (see R. Perry, “Transaction Avoidance Provisions in International
Insolvencies”, (2004) ICCLR 46, 48 [hereinafter: Perry, Transaction Avoidance]).
33 Ibid., Para. 189. For example, ss. 423–425 of the English Insolvency Act 1986 dealing
with transactions defrauding creditors do not specify any time limit within which such
transactions will be regarded as suspect.
34 Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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amount it had received as consideration was significantly lower than the true
value or market price. This is provided the transaction occurred within a
suspect period, i.e. within some (pre-defined) period prior to the commence-
ment of or application for insolvency proceedings. The law may provide
defences so that the transaction is not avoided if certain conditions are satisfied
such as that the beneficiary acted in good faith, the transaction was entered
into for the purpose of carrying on the debtor business and that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the transaction would benefit the debtor’s
business.35 The idea is to restrict the application of the power to avoid to the
vicinity of insolvency and to circumstances where the transaction was clearly
harmful to the creditors as a whole.36 Identifying a transaction as undervalued
for this purpose may not be a simple task.37 Yet, it seems that substance should
win over form and the transaction should be investigated in its totality, enquir-
ing whether the transaction was undervalued as amatter of economic reality in
the sense delineated above.38
Preferences are normally subject to avoidance if they took place within a
suspect period, involved a transfer to a creditor on account of an antecedent
debt and as a result of the transaction the creditor received a larger percentage
of its claim than other creditors. Another typical requirement is that the debtor
was insolvent or close to insolvency when the transaction took place; some
laws further require the intent to prefer.39 Normally, there are defences avail-
able, for example when it can be shown that the transaction was consistent
with normal commercial practise between the parties, or that new value was
created.40 The idea is to treat creditors equitably and tackle favouritism, yet
not to scrutinise transactions which actually benefited the creditors as a whole
– a conclusion which may be reached when considering the commercial real-
ities and the actual economic effect of the transaction.41
35 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Paras. 174–76.
36 Asmentioned above, the goal is to ensure equitable treatment of creditors and to address
the problem of managerial (and creditors’) perverse incentives near insolvency (see
supra notes 4–12 and accompanying texts).
37 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Paras. 175.
38 See also Baird, Legal Approaches (supra note 9), 203, and the approach of the British
court in Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 673 (the House of
Lords emphasised the need to consider the transaction as a whole, and thus consider-
ation provided by a subsidiary of the debtor was also taken into account).
39 The laws of England andWales, for example, require that the debtor should have entered
into the transaction under influence by a desire to favour the person receiving the
preference (see s. 239(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986). Compare with the U.S. approach
which does not require proof of intent but includes numerous exceptions (US Code,
Title 11, s.547).
40 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Paras. 177–79.
41 See, e.g., the Australian case Airservices Australia v Ferrier (1996) 137 ALR 609 (where
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With respect to all avoidable transactions there are usually stricter criteria
when “related persons” (sometimes also referred to as connected persons or
insiders) are involved.42 As mentioned above, the relationship between the
company and the other party to the transaction may be a relevant indicator
of fraud.43 In the context of preferences and transactions below value, the
suspect period will typically be longer where related persons where party to
the transaction or presumptions (or shifted burden of proof) regarding intent
or the financial situation of the company may be applied.44 Indeed, perverse
incentives to shift assets or enrich certain third parties may be most pro-
nounced with regard to associated parties.45 Contracts with connected persons
may not be negotiated in the market place and so one may not assume that the
company received a fair deal.46
Based on these common denominators, but further as a measure for modern-
ising and renovating insolvency laws,47 the Insolvency Guide48 provides a list
of recommendations on avoidance provisions which now represent a consen-
sus regarding best practises in this respect. It is suggested to include powers to
avoid in regard to the three typical avoidable transactions (fraud, undervalued
transactions and preferences) in insolvency laws.49 Crucially, the elements of
avoidance that need to be proven and any possible defences should be specified
in the law. In this regard, it is proposed that the usual defence would be that the
transaction was entered into in the ordinary course of business. It is also
proposed that the law may establish presumptions and permit shifts in the
burden of proof to facilitate the conduct of the proceedings. Furthermore, the
law should specify the suspect period, calculated retrospectively from the date
in a situation of continuous trading the court concluded that the payment to a creditor
actually benefited the company since it induced the creditor to supply goods of equal or
greater value than the amount of the payment).
42 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Para. 182.
43 Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part Two, Ch. II, Para. 182. For example, under the
laws of England and Wales the desire to favour a person receiving a preference is
presumed when the person is connected to the company (s. 239(6) of the Insolvency
Act 1986). It is also presumed that the company was insolvent at the time of entry into
an undervalued transaction (or became insolvent by virtue of entry into the transaction)
when a transaction with a connected person is in question (s. 240(2)(b) of the Insolvency
Act 1986).
45 See Mokal, Corporate Insolvency (supra note 6), 307.
46 See Baird, Legal Approaches (supra note 9), 210–11.
47 See Block-Lieb and Halliday, Harmonization (supra note 24), 476–77 and 488–98 (ob-
serving that the Guide intends to improve legal systems not only converge them).
48 Supra note 13.
49 See Recommendation 87 of the Insolvency Guide (ibid.). It also suggests that security
interests may also be attacked as avoidable (Recommendation 88).
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of the application for or the commencement of insolvency proceedings, within
which a transaction may be avoided.50 In this respect, the Insolvency Guide
suggests that the law may specify that the suspect period for avoidable trans-
actions involving related persons (which should include persons in a position
to control the debtor and a parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the debtor) is
longer than for transactions with unrelated persons.51 To sum it up, avoidance
provisions started with combating fraud and were extended to other forms of
harm to creditors (especially in the vicinity of insolvency), where the basic idea
is to ensure equitable treatment to creditors while preserving the legal effects
of beneficial transactions. This requires focusing on substance rather than legal
form – evaluating the true economic effect of a transaction or a set of trans-
actions. As has been observed, this makes the law potent but also somewhat
unpredictable.52 The task of attacking vulnerable transactions has intensified
with transactions becoming more complex and sophisticated,53 and may reach
its peak in complex business structures such as groups (with multinational
groups adding yet another complexity). Within this business form, transac-
tions may be numerous and more compound, and may typically involve par-
ties associated with one another.
III Addressing the Group Problem
A. Legal Form Versus Economic Realities
The gist of avoidance provisions is now clear, yet the question is how these
should be applied in a group context, i.e. where transactions have been con-
ducted between groupmembers or in regard to creditors of affiliate companies.
Should such transactions be addressed on an entity-by-entity basis, namely
with no regard to the group situation, or should economic realities lead theway
to determine whether to avoid or uphold any such transaction, ignoring legal
form to a certain extent. This section will briefly consider the general tension
between entity law and enterprise principles (the two alternative doctrines for
regulating groups) before moving on (in the subsequent section) to address
avoidance provisions in the group context.
Traditional “entity law” suggests applying the fundamental corporate law
concepts of corporate personality and limited liability in the group context.
Thus, the distinct corporate personality of each groupmember and the limited
liability of the parent and each affiliate vis-a-vis the other groupmembers shall
50 Recommendations 89 and 97 of the Insolvency Guide (ibid.).
51 Recommendation 90 and Introduction, Para. 12 (jj) of the Insolvency Guide (ibid.).
52 Baird, Legal Approaches (supra note 9), 214.
53 Ibid.
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be upheld. In contrast, modern “enterprise law” suggests that, at least under
certain circumstances, the enterprise should be regarded as the relevant entity
and that effect should be given to the relationship among the groupmembers.54
Enterprise principles are thus concerned with matching rights and responsi-
bilities to the collective economic activity, i.e. to the enterprise comprised of
separate but related companies.55 Arguably, this reflects current economic
realities better where enterprises operate unified businesses as groups. Con-
sequently, a “new” entity is recognised, redefining the legal boundaries of the
business organisation to some extent so as to suit economic realities.56
I have suggested elsewhere that whether enterprise law should supersede en-
tity law should depend on the degree to which a legal device based on enter-
prise principles actually interferes with the notion of limited liability. Where it
does not, there should be little problem to give effect to the connections
between group members.57 The starting position should then be the economic
reality where the group may represent something unique – different from the
mere sum of its parts.58 Effect should be given to this reality if this fulfils the
objectives of the relevant area of the law.59 For example, it is desirable that
groups prepare consolidated annual reports. This will not come into conflict
with limited liability and will give a true and fair view of the financial situation
of the group members.
Only when limited liability is at stake, greater caution is required as it may
contravene efficiency advantages underlying the rationale for limited liability.
Thus, because eachgroupmember is liable for its debts and assets are segregated
within each entity, creditors do not need to monitor the creditworthiness of
other groupmemberswhen they extendcredit to a particular entity (thus saving
transaction costs).60 Interference with limited liability should be the exception
54 PI Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations 15 Del. J.
Corp. L. 283 (1990); CM Schmitthoff, The Wholly Owned and the Controlled Subsid-
iary Journal of Business Law, 218, 219–222 (1978).
55 Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge (supra note 2), at 245.
56 AA Berle Jr, The theory of enterprise entity 47 Colum L Rev 343, 348–350 (1947);
Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge, supra note 2, at 232–233.
57 See Mevorach, Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 47–49.
58 Id.
59 See P.I. Blumberg, “The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of
Corporate Groups” (2005) 37 Conn. L. Rev. 605, 611; R.B. Thompson, “Piercing the
veil within corporate groups: corporate shareholders asmere investors” (1999) 13Conn.
J. Int’l L. 379, 396.
60 On the benefits of ‘asset partitioning’ see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, “The Essen-
tial Role ofOrganizational Law” (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387. See further on limited liability
in the group context Mevorach, Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 41–49.
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rather than the rule, andhereenterprise lawshouldhaveamodest role–assisting
to shape the exceptions to limited liability in the group context.61 How then
should enterprise law apply in the context of avoidance provisions?
B. Adjusting the Usual Avoiding Provisions to
Accommodate Corporate Groups
B.1 The Effect of Enterprise Law in the Transaction Avoidance Context
What is, first, crucial to enquire is whether enterprise law, applied to trans-
action avoidance provisions, would threaten limited liability in any way. As
concluded above, if this may be the result then muchmore caution is required.
The answer to this question depends on the way enterprise lawwould apply in
this context. If the application of enterprise law would mean that any trans-
action between entities of a corporate group would be regarded as a trans-
action between divisions of a single entity (that is the group), then the effect of
enterprise law is indeed significant and harmful to the economic rationale of
limited liability. It means a mix of assets and liabilities, ignoring the asset
partitioning between the entities. If, however, enterprise law only assists in
determining whether a transaction should be upheld or avoided, allowing to
investigate the benefit to the company in question while appreciating the big-
ger picture of the group situation and the inter-relations among the group
members, then there is not much at stake. The assets and debts of the different
entities are not being mixed, liability for the debts of any member is not
imposed on another member, debts are not generally and across-the-board
re-characterised, eliminated, subordinated and so forth. Rather, only a partic-
ular transaction may be reversed, and only the creditors of the relevant entity
(involved in the transaction) are affected to the extent that they have benefited
from a transaction outside the terms of the original bargain (because the trans-
action was preferential, fraudulent, undervalued and so forth). Applied in this
way, enterprise law should be ‘welcomed’ (when addressing transaction avoid-
ance provisions) and utilised with little hesitation and no further justification
where it can enhance the aims of the area of the law (and have some added
value with reference to entity law) – in this case, the goals of insolvency law.
Indeed, enterprise law can shed important light on vulnerable transactions
involving enterprise groups. As concluded above, to achieve a fair and efficient
insolvency system a balance should be struck between the finality of trans-
actions and the protection of creditors from harmful transactions taking place
in the vicinity of bankruptcy (or from any fraudulent transfers). In this respect,
61 Ibid.
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substance should prevail over form – revealing the true economic effect of the
transaction. Here, enterprise law can certainly assist as it can allow a better
understanding of the true nature of the transaction and the commercial reality
surrounding it. In particular, it can ensure that the diversified scene of group
structures and organisational patterns is taken into account. Groups come
about in different shapes – some closely integrated, some true conglomerates
with no significant links between themembers62 – and therefore a “one size fits
all” approach to how transactions should be treated in this context is not
appropriate. The phenomenon of groups requires a nuanced approach to its
regulation. Pure entity law which would consider each group member on a
completely separate basis might ignore these nuances (and thus the effect of
the type of group at hand on the legitimacy of the transaction), defeating the
law’s objectives. This concept will be further explored below while investigat-
ing UNCITRAL’s new recommendations on avoidance powers (in the context
of the insolvency of enterprise groups). Specifically, it will be explored
whether the recommendations fall within the ambit of the desirable balance
between entity and enterprise law as delineated above.
B.2 Assessing the New Recommendations (of UNCITRAL) on
Avoidance and Groups
UNCITRAL’s new recommendations regarding avoidance provisions in the
group context63 commence with a “purpose clause”. The clause seems to
generally appreciate the concept of applying enterprise law in the context
of the existing avoidance provisions. It does not suggest, though, any across-
the-board elimination of transactions ignoring the separation between the
group entities. Indeed, that would not be desirable. Thus, the clause suggests
that:
“The purpose of avoidance provisions as among enterprise group members is to provide, in addition
to the considerations set forth in recommendations 87–99, that the insolvency law may:
(a) Permit the court to take into account that the transaction took place in the context of an
enterprise group and
(b) Establish the circumstances that may be considered by the court.”64
Specific considerations may be taken into account when applying the usual
transaction avoidance provisions (on which the Insolvency Guide already
62 See Blumberg, TheMultinational Challenge, (supra note 2), 144–47. See alsoMevorach,
Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 130–33.
63 Which will be included in Part III of the Insolvency Guide (see supra note 19).
64 Part III of the Guide (ibid.), Recommendations 217–218, Purpose of Legislative Pro-
visions.
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provides recommendations65) in a group context. But what sort of consider-
ations? Would the enterprise approach imply harsher scrutiny of transactions
involving group members, or rather the other way round? The recommenda-
tions provide that in considering vulnerable transactions in the group context
courts may take into account the circumstances in which the transaction took
place, and those circumstances may include:
”. . . the relationship between the parties to the transaction; the degree of integration between
enterprise groupmembers that are parties to the transaction; the purpose of the transaction; whether
the transaction contributed to the operations of the group as a whole; and whether the transaction
granted advantages to enterprise group members or other related persons that would not normally
be granted between unrelated parties.”66
The recommendation refers to a host of considerations of circumstances and
does not limit itself to either avoidance or legitimisation of transactions. The
enterprise lookout over the transaction may thus lead to either avoiding a
transaction that might not have been avoided if conducted in a single company
context or upholding a transaction that would otherwise have been avoided if
not entered into in a group context.
Consider firstly the reversal of transactions based on group considerations
(which is one possible outcome of giving effect to group interrelationship).
In fact, the concept of considering transactions between related persons as
suspect is not new. It was mentioned above that it is common to subject
transactions between related persons (which usually include group members)
to particular scrutiny, and thus apply longer twilight periods or presumptions
against the validity of the transactions.67 Indeed, the risk of opportunistic
behaviour (including harming creditors by entering into transactions) is con-
siderable in the context of groups. Particularly, if the enterprise operated a
single business or there were other significant administrative or financial links
between the entities68 (making it an ‘integrated group’), controllers and other
affiliates may be in a position to be knowledgeable about the financial situa-
tion of other group members, typically before it is revealed to outsiders.
Under such circumstances, group controllers may attempt to shift assets from
a distressed entity to other entities within the group, making sure that the
65 Recommendations 87–99 of the Insolvency Guide (supra note 13).
66 Part III of the Guide (supra note 19), Recommendation 217. Recommendation 218
further provides that the insolvency law should specify the manner in which the ele-
ments to be proven to avoid a particular transaction and defences to avoidance would
apply in the group context.
67 See supra notes 42–46 and 51 and accompanying texts.
68 SeeMevorach,Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 132-4. See also PTMuchlinski,Multi-
national Enterprises and the Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 48. If the
group was integrated even to the extent that assets and debts were intermingled, other
remedies may be more adequate (see infra Part II(C)).
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assets will not be distributed to the creditors of the distressed entity, but rather
utilised by othermembers of the group.69 In an international setting (where the
group is multinational), opportunities for abuse are even greater, as for in-
stance, assets may be transferred to remote jurisdictions.70
But the main novelty in the recommendation is certainly the latter aspect of
the approach, namely the possibility that a transaction may be regarded le-
gitimate (and be upheld) by taking a broad group-wide perspective, even if
entered into in the vicinity of bankruptcy and could have been perceived as
undervalued or preferential to a creditor if seen on a separate-entity basis.
More generally, it is the concept that the transaction should be considered in
a broad group context whichmay result in either its reversal or its maintaining.
Thus far, legal regimes have tended to take an entity approach and apply the
normal requirements under avoidance provisions when considering whether
to uphold intra-group transactions.71 At the least, an enterprise approach is not
readily apparent in avoidance transactions’ provisions, apart from the idea to
treat transactions with related persons with greater scrutiny. Yet, transactions
between group members, even (and in many cases especially) on the brink of
bankruptcy, may make sense from a commercial perspective, particularly be-
cause they took place within a group of entities.72 Such transactions could be
attacked as preferential or as depleting an affiliate’s assets if taking place among
‘strangers’. This, again, is particularly relevant when considering the inte-
grated groups.73 Considering the economic reality of a group being a single
business and/or having significant connections between the entities may sug-
69 It should be noted that two group members that are parties to an asset transfer may,
among themselves, be non-integrated, e.g. operating in two different industries, yet they
may have a mutual controller to which each of the entities is closely related and which
may have initiated the vulnerable transaction. See, for example, the allegations regarding
diversions of funds between the two different businesses controlled by the Tanzi family
that controlled the Parmalat group (which collapsed in 2003). According to statements
of Parmalat’s officers during interrogations, funds were diverted from Parmalat Finan-
ziaria SpA to Parmatour, the controlling family’s tourism business (see The Associated
Press, “Ex – Parmalat CFO Reportedly Blames Tanzi”, New York Times, October 3,
2004).
70 See Mevorach, Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 286. See also Part III of the Guide
(supra note 19), Paras. 77–78.
71 See Blumberg et al, Blumberg on Corporate Groups (Aspen Publishers, 2005), Vol 2, s.
85.05[A] [hereinafter: Blumberg,Blumberg onCorporateGroups], at vol 2, s. 85.19[a]; A
Muscat, The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Insolvent Subsidiary
(Dartmouth Publishing Group, Aldershot 1996), 232 [hereinafter: Muscat, The Liabil-
ity], at. 228). Though, occasionally, indirect benefit to a groupmember from the support
it provides to other members of the group may be acknowledged when considering
what ‘fair consideration’ is (ibid).
72 See Part III of the Guide (supra note 19), Para. 79.
73 Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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gest a different allocation of benefits and detriments (or estimation of a pref-
erential position), compared to the consideration of the transaction which is
based on a separate-entity perspective. In particular, an enterprise-wide ap-
proach may show that there was a group interest in entering into the trans-
action which may have also benefited the entity that is party to it.
Consider, for example, a transaction where one affiliate gives a guarantee or
security to the lender of another group member for the purpose of allowing
the latter to raise further funds crucial to the continuance of its business.
Between unrelated parties, the transaction may seem unfavourable to the
guarantor. Under certain circumstances, it may seem as a pure gift with no
consideration if the guarantor does not receive any fee or anything tangible in
return. However, considering the integration between these two entities may
lead to the conclusion that the company guaranteeing the debt may have been
dependent on the other affiliate to an extent (e.g., in terms of supply of prod-
ucts or services). Therefore, it would have benefited from ensuring that the
affiliate keeps operating. Generally, a guarantor entity in an integrated group
may have a true commercial interest in strengthening the financial position and
the business of other group members, being as it is part of a single enterprise.74
In case it appears that the guarantor had indeed some benefit from giving
the guarantee (when considered on a group-wide basis), extra care should be
applied when considering to reverse the transaction to the detriment of the
entity in favour of which the guarantee was given to the lender. Indeed, in a
group scenario it may well be that intra-group guarantees as described above
are the only way to secure any credit for the distressed affiliate and gain
breathing-space for the group as a whole.
Similar considerations may take place in regard to transactions which may
seem preferential. The insolvent affiliate may have paid an antecedent debt to a
related company rather shortly before entering into insolvency, i.e. within the
suspect period. Happening between the debtor and an external creditor, this
may be regarded as preferring the latter. It may seem evenmore suspicious as it
was paid to a related company with knowledge of the financial situation of the
affiliate in issue. Yet, considering the transaction in the broad group context,
an investigation of the nature of the group may reveal that there was commer-
cial sense in the transaction. Specifically if the parties to the transaction be-
longed to an integrated group of the sort that runs a single business, it might
have been crucial to the continuance of the business of the (now) insolvent
affiliate to pay its related company because of the inter-dependence of the
group members (if, e.g., the group was in the process of closing a major deal).
In other words, at the time of entry into the transaction, taking an enterprise
74 See also Blumberg,Blumberg on Corporate Groups (supra note 71), at Vol 2, s. 85.05[A];
Muscat, The Liability (supra note 71), 232.
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approach may reveal that the benefit to the general body of creditors (of that
affiliate), accrued from the payment in question, was greater than the amount
of the payment itself.75
In summary, consideration of the various circumstances which UNCITRAL
recommendations refer to is indeed crucial to the design of a desirable ap-
proach to transaction avoidance in the group context, ultimately enhancing a
fair and efficient bankruptcy system. The essence of those considerations
seems to be to take a group-wide perspective on the transaction which in-
volved group members, emphasising substance over form and enquiring
whether there was a group explanation (or otherwise group suspicion) regard-
ing the transaction. The degree of integration of the group members is a key
factor, just as well as the relations between themembers and the way the group
has been managed. In case of integration and close connections, presumptions
against the related company are stronger. Yet, taking such a group-wide per-
spective may, at the same time, actually mean upholding a transaction. In no
event, though, do the recommendations suggest to ignore the corporate form
and treat the group members as belonging to a single entity. All in all, they
strike a desirable balance between entity law and enterprise law.
C. Avoidance Provisions versus Other Solutions for Group Bankruptcies
It was mentioned above that there may be particular circumstances related to
the group operations which could justify more dramatic remedies in terms of
their interference with the corporate form. Indeed, the new recommendations
of UNCITRAL for the insolvency of groups include additional solutions and
remedies, some of which are quite interventionist, others more procedural. It
is important to appreciate the relationship between these solutions and the
avoidance provisions and ascertain under which circumstances each would be
more adequate and what the role of each solution is.
Substantive remedies include the recommendation regarding substantive con-
solidation,76 and further commentary regarding subordination and extension
of liability.77 The question is which remedy shall be applicable – avoidance of
transactions or any of the other remedies – in situations of misbehaviour in
regard to transactions involving group members detrimental to the creditors.
The framework discussed above for resolving the group problem hints at the
answer. As aforementioned, we should be particularly cautious not to ruin the
75 Cf. Airservices Australia v Ferrier, mentioned above (supra note 41).
76 Part III of the Guide (supra note 19), Recommendations 219–231.
77 Ibid., Paras. 83–104.
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benefits of limited liability and asset-partitioning when applying enterprise
principles.78 In this light, applying avoidance provisions to tackle intra-group
transactions and misbehaviour in the group context would usually be the
better option compared to the other more interventionist remedies. As men-
tioned above, applying enterprise law to avoiding transactions (in the way
suggested above) may pose less threat to limited liability.79 Extending liability,
on the other hand, would make one member – the member responsible for the
detrimental transactions – generally liable for the debts of the subsidiary,
which stands in clear conflict with the limited liability concept. Substantive
consolidation (the pooling of assets and debts in the course of insolvency,
which usually includes the elimination of intra-group transactions80) com-
pletely ignores the separation between themembers of the group (even though
the competition takes place between the creditors of the different members
and not an entity and its shareholders81), thus interfering with the benefits of
assets-partitioning.82 Similarly, subordination of intra-group claims to the
claims of the insolvent group member’s external creditors involves competi-
tion among creditors (rather than a mere imposition of liability upon a share-
holder),83 yet, here too, the benefits of ‘asset-partitioning’ are at stake. The
prospect of equitable subordination of intra-group debts increases the risk of
non-payment to the subordinated party and therefore induces the creditors of
that company to investigate the other affiliates’ creditworthiness.84 Ultimately,
subordination serves a similar function as veil-piercing since if the claims of a
related company are subordinated, the creditors of the insolvent affiliate will
be satisfied from assets that would otherwise serve to partially satisfy the
claims of the related company.85 Therefore, all these other remedies proposed
or discussed by UNCITRAL should be applied only when avoidance provi-
sions are not adequate (or cannot tackle the misbehaviour) under specific
circumstances.
78 See supra Part III(A).
79 See supra Part III(B).
80 See e.g. pooling orders under the New Zealand Companies Act 1993, ss. 271–272, and
substantive consolidation orders based on 11 USC, s. 105 (2000).
81 J Landers, “A Unified Approach to Parent, subsidiary and Affiliated Questions in
Bankruptcy” (1975) 42 U Chi L Rev 589, 634 (arguing that the doctrine of limited
liability is not involved in the issue of consolidation) [hereinafter: Landers, A Unified
Approach].
82 Unless substantive consolidation is applied by consent (creditors should be able to
waive their ‘asset partitioning’ benefit).
83 Landers, A Unified Approach (supra note 81), 634.
84 Though the potential liability under the subordination regime of the parent is limited to
the amount of the loan, whereas imposing general liability may amount to the entire
subsidiary’s debts (see R Posner, “The Legal Rights of Creditors of Affiliated corpo-
rations: An Economic Approach” (1976) 43 U Chi L Rev 499, 517–19).
85 Blumberg, Blumberg on Corporate Groups (supra note 71), s.87.01.
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One such scenario is where the group is so heavily integrated that its assets are
intermingled in the ordinary course of business.86 Under these circumstances,
transferring assets among the entities might have taken place excessively and
even without record-keeping as if this was not a transaction between separate
entities, but rather an allocation of assets among ‘departments’ of the same
entity. If this occurred, it might be impossible or extremely difficult to detect
the actual transactions that took place among the group members and which
entity owns an asset or which entity’s assets were depleted as a result of the
intra-group transactions. Untangling the transactions will be either impossible
or disproportionally costly. Eliminating the transactions by a pooling order
will be the most adequate solution. It represents a rare exception to limited
liability where asset-partitioning was only a ‘façade’ and is therefore not really
defeated by substantive consolidation.87 Under these particular circumstances,
pooling will benefit the creditors (by making the process much more efficient)
and will not harm asset-separation as this concept was not kept by the types of
groups which were excessively entangled.
The recommendations of UNCITRAL on substantive consolidation seem to
appreciate their ‘intrusive nature’. They provide that substantive consolida-
tion should be applied only under exceptional circumstances of intermingling
of assets and debts,88 or where the court is convinced that enterprise group
members were engaged in a fraudulent scheme or activity with no legitimate
business purpose (and only where substantive consolidation is essential to
rectify that scheme or activity).89
There are no new recommendations provided on subordination and extension
of liability, only commentary reflecting the discussion of the issue by the
working group of UNCITRAL and various possible ways to address the
matter. This is to be regretted as concrete recommendations would have shed
light, not only on the international standard regarding these remedies (enhanc-
ing certainty in this area), but also on their relationship to substantive con-
solidation and avoidance provisions.90 In any event, in light of the discussion
above, it seems that subordination and extension of liability should be “weap-
86 See Mevorach, Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 132, 290.
87 Ibid., at 225. Transactions between group members and external creditors are not elim-
inated but may be tackled by the representative of the pooled estate. The proposals
suggest that the date from which the suspect period should be calculated under such
circumstances may be either different for each group member or a common date for all
members included in the substantive consolidation (Part III of the Guide (supra note
19), Recommendation 228).
88 Ibid., Recommendations 220(a).
89 Ibid., Recommendation 220(b).
90 See also I Mevorach, “Is the Future Bright for Enterprise Groups in Insolvency? –
Analysis of UNCITRAL’s New Recommendations on the Domestic Aspects”, in In-
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ons” of last resort to be applied only when there is proof of wrongful or
fraudulent conduct and the misbehaviour cannot be linked to specific trans-
actions (e.g. onewhich defrauded creditors), or where such transactions do not
fulfil the specific criteria of the avoiding powers (because, for example, they
did not take place within the suspect period).91
The new recommendations further attempt to facilitate the provision of finan-
ces by enterprise group members, including group members subject to insol-
vency proceedings. They recommend that the insolvency law permit intra-
group financing (including grants of securities or guarantees to other lenders
providing the finance) after the commencement of insolvency proceedings
(“post commencement financing”) and specify the priority that applies to such
financing. It should be taken into account whether such finance is necessary
for the continued operations, survival, preservation or enhancement of the
receiving group member’s business value. And in case creditors seemed to
be harmed, it should also be considered whether this will be balanced by the
benefit to be derived from the financial advancement (or grant of a security,
guarantee or other assurance) which may eventually lead to a better result for
the group as a whole.92 In this regard, an approach similar to the one taken in
regard to avoidance provisions is taken, where enterprise law is central and a
group-wide perspective is utilised. Indeed, limited liability is not at stake, but
rather it is considered whether a specific loan transaction was in fact beneficial
to the group member, viewed from a wider group perspective.
Finally, the new proposals contain procedural solutions for group bankrupt-
cies, key among which is the concept of procedural coordination. This permits
proceedings against two ormore groupmembers to be handled coordinately, if
possible before the same court and with the same insolvency representative.93
This does not imply any substantive remedy. Rather, the idea is to facilitate
group-wide efficient solutions and to minimise costs by avoiding duplication
of effort and facilitating the transfer of information, valuation of assets and
identification of creditors.94 Such coordination and centralisation of proceed-
ings can also facilitate the handling of past manipulations – including vulner-
able transactions – as it will make it easier to appreciate the broader group
context and obtain the necessary information which can shed light on the
ternational Insolvency Law: Reforms and Challenges 371, 391 (P.J. Omar ed., forth-
coming 2011).
91 A discussion of the question- when exactly liability should be imposed is beyond the
scope of this paper (see on this issue Mevorach, Enterprise Groups (supra note 21), 294–
310).
92 Part III of the Guide (supra note 19), Recommendations 211–216, and Para. 63.
93 There may be varying degrees of coordination (see Part III of the Guide, ibid., Recom-
mendations 202–210, 232–236).
94 Ibid., Para. 22.
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transaction as a whole. At the same time, though, problems of conflict of
interests should be tackled as the avoidance of transactions could benefit
one member and be detrimental to another. In case it seems necessary, addi-
tional representatives may be appointed.95
IV A Comment on International Complexities
Vulnerable transactions involving international groups present additional dif-
ficulties. Although this paper has emphasised the similarities between legal
systems regarding voidable transactions, a harmonisation of insolvency laws
in general and avoiding powers in particular has as yet not been achieved.96
Certainly, the application of these provisions to the group scenario in different
legal systems is not readily ascertainable, as mentioned above. Undoubtedly,
differences between legal systems make it a difficult task to design a cross-
border transaction and to ensure it will not be derogated by any laws which
may have relevance to the company (which had cross-border business).97 Ex
post (in the course of insolvency), the international scenario could result in
difficulties to tackle past manipulations (as well as to defend them) where
problems of recognition and enforcement of judgements may arise. Moreover,
taking a group perspective may be unrealistic where the group is spread among
different jurisdictions and information is not within reach.
Further harmonisation and convergence of avoiding powers (including their
application in the group context) is thus crucial. Certainty of the similarity of
applicable insolvency rules in regard to a transaction will enhance legal pre-
dictability, even if is the transaction takes place between parties situated in
different jurisdictions. Similar insolvency rules will also increase the likeli-
hood of smooth and fast recognition and enforcement of relevant judge-
ments.98 Especially in the group context, this may be crucial, as legal regimes
tend to be protective of the notions of corporate separate personality and
limited liability. If a foreign system is perceived as too intrusive to these legal
95 Ibid., Recommendation 233.
96 There are, for example, variations in regard to the duration of the suspect period, or the
need to prove intent to prefer a creditor.
97 Perry, Transaction Avoidance (supra note 32), 46.
98 See e.g. the case ofRubin (Rubin v Eurofinance and OthersCA 30 July 2010) where the
English Court of Appeal concluded that a judgement of a New York court avoiding a
transaction should be enforceable in the UK without the need for a separate process to
be opened, noting the similarities between the avoidance provisions under English Law
and under American law (ibid., Para. 60). See also the report prepared by INSOL
Europe (commissioned by the European Parliament (European Parliament Report:
Harmonization of Insolvency Law (26 April, 2010), Para. VIII recommending harmo-
nisation of avoidance powers within Europe.
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institutions, there may be great difficulties in terms of recognition and en-
forcement of judgements rendering transactions void.
Harmonisation of the private-international-law aspects can further assist in
overcoming the above-mentioned problems. This is particularly true for a
uniform jurisdictional rule which could direct all proceedings against group
members to a single jurisdiction (or allow the identification of a coordinating
forum), referring to this jurisdictions’ insolvency law in regard to the appli-
cation of avoiding powers and enforcing its judgements. This way, informa-
tion about the intra-group transactions may be more readily ascertained, a
single court could consider all relevant circumstances relevant to the intra-
group transactions and its decisions could then be recognised and enforced in
the other jurisdictions involved.
This might be achieved under current frameworks for cross-border insolvency
if a single centre of main interests (COMI) is identified for all relevant group
members, and if the principal court’s judgements are recognised and enforced
elsewhere. Under both the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (“EC
Regulation)99 and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model
Law”),100 main proceedings are to be recognised if they were opened at the
company’s COMI.101 Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has estab-
lished the notion that avoidance issues are matters directly related to the
insolvency of a company and thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
country in which main proceedings have commenced.102 A similar approach
may be embraced by countries adopting the Model Law103 or by applying
national private-international-law rules of insolvency.104
The problem is that considering the COMI of each group member separately
99 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L160) (EC).
100 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3
(2000).
101 Article 3(1) and 16 of the ECRegulation (supra note 99); Article 2(b) and 17(2)(a) of the
Model Law (supra note 100).
102 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (c-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168.
103 See Rubin (supra note 98) where the English Court of Appeal confirmed that recog-
nition of the avoidance actions which took place in the course of the US bankruptcy
proceedings should be granted as these proceedings were part and parcel of the main
bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. It then also concluded that the judgement
should be enforced in the UK without the need to open separate proceedings.
Although this decision was based on common-law principles of assistance (noting that
the main principle in private international law of insolvency is that of universality and
unity), the court did express the view that a similar result may be achieved under the
Model Law’s provisions on cooperation (ibid., Para. 63).
104 Ibid.
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may result in multiple proceedings (especially if the identification of the
COMI heavily relies on the place of the registered office of each company105),
rather than in a unitary insolvency process which could receive worldwide
recognition and consequently apply universally to all the group’s assets. Still, if
the proceedings against each groupmember are recognised and judgements are
mutually enforced, the problem is mitigated. However, such multiple claims
and recognition proceedings could significantly increase the costs and the
likelihood of success in challenging voidable transactions. This can be over-
come by a coordination of the multiple processes, also in regard to the avoid-
ance powers (as suggested by UNCITRAL’s new recommendations on the
international aspects of enterprise groups’ insolvencies106). The adoption of
pre-defined rules regarding the centralisation or coordination (from a single
forum) of group proceedings, embracing a jurisdictional rule which identifies
the centre of the group as a whole would be even better.107
With regard to choice of law of avoiding powers, current rules are quite un-
certain and different options can be found in national and international re-
gimes. Under the EC Regulation,108 for example, avoidance provisions are
subject to the law of the forum unless the other party to the transaction with
the debtor can defend the transaction, showing that it is valid and unimpeach-
able according to the law by which it is properly governed. The Model Law109
does not provide uniform choice-of-law rules. Although, under the Model
Law, a foreign insolvency representative may seek remedies aimed at illegit-
imate antecedent transactions in the jurisdiction which has granted recogni-
tion to the foreign proceedings – this does not create substantive rights or
determine the choice-of-law rule.110 Further predictability, efficiency and fair-
ness in the handling of group bankruptcies including the resolution of past
manipulations could be promoted by the adoption of a universalistic uniform
choice-of-law rule. Such a rule would refer to the main forum’s law rather than
to the territory in which the transaction occurred (or to any other case-specific
105 Rather than to focus on the actual head-office which will usually allow the identifica-
tion of a single forum for all group members in an integrated-centralised group scenar-
io (see I. Mevorach, “The Home Country of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing
Insolvency” (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 427).
106 Part III of the Guide (supra note 19), Para. 236(c).
107 UNCITRAL working group has attempted to develop an ‘enterprise group COMI’
concept (identifying the centre of main proceedings of a group for the purpose of
international jurisdiction in insolvency), yet a consensus on this has not been reached
(see I. Mevorach, “Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise
Groups in Insolvency” (2010) 18 Cardozo J. of Int’l & Comp. L. 359, 389–414).
108 Article 13 of the EC Regulation (supra note 99).
109 Supra note 100.
110 Article 23 of the Model Law (ibid.). See also Fletcher, Insolvency (supra note 17), at
471.
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choice-of-law rules based on contacts and state interests presented in each
case).111 Indeed, the Insolvency Guide (in its original parts, in regard to single
debtors) proposes that insolvency proceedings shall be governed by the law of
the forum (the lex fori concursus) with limited exceptions. Specifically, it pro-
poses that the insolvency law of the state in which insolvency proceedings
have commenced may apply to vulnerable transactions.112
V Conclusion
Avoidance provisions have a role to play in promoting bankruptcy goals in the
context of corporate groups’ default. A corporate group is not a corporate
body as such and so in general, intra-group transactions do not take place
between ‘departments’ of the same entity, but rather between separate legal
entities. Therefore, they may be vulnerable and avoided in the context of
bankruptcy. In fact, transactions between group members may be particularly
suspect considering the possible close relationship and prior knowledge group
entities may have on one another. At the same time, though, these transactions
may make sense commercially when considering the broad context of group
operations and group interest. Enterprise law should guide the way in which
vulnerable transactions are scrutinised where groups are involved, yet its role
should be limited to the confinements of avoiding specific transactions. The
result cannot be to break the walls separating the legal entities, unless there are
specific justifications for this. In that case, other remedies, such as substantive
consolidation or subordination, should come into play. The new recommen-
dations of UNCITRAL on avoidance provisions involving enterprise groups
seem to go along such lines. Thus, they strike an adequate balance between
entity law and enterprise law. Their implementation in legal systems would
certainly advance the goals of insolvency – promoting fair and efficient in-
solvency laws. Their wide adoption (which could result in a degree of harmo-
nisation in this area) would also serve the goal of advancing an effective cross-
border insolvency system, specifically in regard to the treatment of interna-
tional groups in default.Ex ante efficiency would be promotedwhere the rules
111 Especially considering that following the application of avoiding powers, the debtor’s
assets are redistributed according to a set of priority rules which are also to be deter-
mined by the forum’s court and laws (see JLWestbrook, “Choice of Avoidance Law in
Global Insolvencies” (1991) 17 Brook J Int’l L 499, 530; Westbrook, Avoidance (supra
note 25), 902-04). See also the case of Condor Insurance where the US appellate court
concluded that avoidance relief under the foreign law (of the foreign main forum) can
be granted under Chapter 15 (the US Model Law version) (In re Condor Insurance
Limited, Fogarty v Petroquest Resources Inc. 601 F.3d 319, 2010 WL 961613 (5th Cir.
2010).
112 Insolvency Guide (supra note 13), Part two, Ch. I, Recommendation 31 (g).
ECFR 2/2011 Transaction Avoidance in Bankruptcy of Corporate Groups 257
are more readily ascertained. Furthermore, greater similarity between the laws
could facilitate mutual recognition and enforcement of judgements, as well
as the deference to foreign forums which would then be able to comprehen-
sively and effectively handle all insolvency matters concerning the enterprise
group.
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